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IMPORTANCE, VALUE, AND CAUSAL IMPACT 
 
GUY KAHANE, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 
ABSTRACT. Many believe that because we’re so small, we must be utterly insignificant on the 
cosmic scale. But whether this is so depends on what it takes to be important. On one view, what 
matters for importance is the difference to value that something makes. On this view, what 
determines our cosmic importance isn’t our size, but what else of value is out there. But a rival 
view also seems plausible: that importance requires sufficient causal impact on the relevant 
scale; since we have no such impact on the grand scale, that would entail our cosmic 
insignificance. I argue that despite appearances, causal impact is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for importance. All that matters is impact on value. Since parts can have non-causal impact on 
the value of the wholes that contain them, this means that we might have great impact on the 
grandest scale without ever leaving our little planet. 
 
 
Samuel Beckett once said that “[s]ince Galileo made the earth into a speck of dust in a vast 
universe… we are condemned to live in a world of desolation”.1 Another apostle of human 
insignificance, if a lesser writer, was H. P. Lovecraft who, in typical purple prose, described 
us humans as “the miserable denizens of a wretched little flyspeck on the back door of a 
microscopic universe”.2 Such remarks are common, and many take it as a given that the 
vastness of the universe described by modern science reveals that humanity, and our 
individual lives, are utterly unimportant on the cosmic scale—even if most of us quickly 
forget this crushing sense of insignificance.  
 Many philosophers agree that our minute size, compared to the vast universe that 
surrounds us, renders us cosmically insignificant. For example, Susan Wolf writes that many  
 
take the fundamental lesson to be learned from the contemplation of our place in the universe to 
be that we are cosmically insignificant.... In the absence of a God… it appears that we can only 
be significant to each other, to beings, that is, as pathetically small as ourselves. We want to be 
important, but we cannot be important...3 
 
 This conclusion Wolf accepts: these pessimist philosophers, she says, “are right about 
the futility of trying to make ourselves important”. We have no choice but to come to terms 
with what she describes as “the fact of our insignificance”;4 the desire to be important is 
“unsatisfiable”.5 And David Benatar agrees that “Earthly life is… without significance, 
import or purpose beyond our planet”.6 
 But there is also an opposing view. Responding to the suggestion that the idea of 
cosmic significance makes no sense, Peter Singer comments that “[i]n the unlikely event that 
the Earth is the only place in the universe where sentient beings ever exist, then our judgment 
of how well the universe has gone should depend entirely on how well the existence of 
 
1 Buttner, 2001. 
2 Lovecraft, 1918. 
3 Wolf, 2011. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Benatar, 2018, 36. Benatar insists, however, that our lives are still significant on more restricted scales. 
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sentient beings on Earth has gone.”7 And Derek Parfit ends his On What Matters with the 
remark that “[i]f there are no rational beings elsewhere, it may depend on us and our 
successors whether it will all be worth it, because the existence of the Universe will have 
been on the whole good.”8 It certainly sounds as if Singer and Parfit think that if we’re alone 
in the universe, we might actually be of great cosmic significance. This is a conclusion that I 
have defended in past work.9 
 This can sound odd: how can we be cosmically important without having an impact on 
the cosmos—without, as Wolf puts it, making “a big and lasting splash”?10 Benatar and 
Hughes criticise my argument along these lines.11 To possess importance on a given scale, 
they say, we must have a significant causal impact on how things go at that scale. Since we 
obviously have no such grand impact, genuine cosmic importance is out of reach. 
 I will argue that we don’t need to have a great causal impact on the cosmic scale to be 
cosmically important. Causal impact seems critical to importance because, on more familiar 
smaller scales, it’s often a condition for importance. But causal impact isn’t necessary for 
importance. We could be cosmically important without setting foot outside the Earth. While 
my aim here is to defend these grand claims about cosmic significance, my argument also 
sheds light on broader questions about the nature of importance and its relation to causal 
impact.  
 
The Value Impact Account of Importance 
 
Before we can answer grand questions about our cosmic importance, we need to clarify what 
it means to describe something as important in more mundane contexts. To pick just some 
random examples, the things we attribute importance to include physical exercise, a revealing 
slip of the tongue, Hitler, and the Enlightenment. What these things have in common is that 
they make a difference—and things are more important the greater the difference they make. 
Now there are many ways to make a difference, and many of these are trivial.12 The kind of 
difference making that endows things with genuine importance is, I suggest, difference to 
value. 
 On what I call  
 
The Value Impact view. The degree to which something is important, relative to a domain, 
is a function of how much difference it makes to overall intrinsic value in this domain, 
compared to other things in it; and the more difference to value something makes, in this 
way, the more attention and concern it merits.13   
  
 Let me unpack this. To begin with, importance is always relative to some domain. The 
revealing slip of the tongue that offended your potential client, and perhaps derailed your 
career, can be important relative to multiple domains: the sale, your career, your family’s 
prospects, etc. But you wouldn’t be surprised that this seminal event (relative to these 
domains!) isn’t a news headline, or studied by future historians. Your slip of the tongue—or 
for that matter, your career and life more generally, is just unimportant in the context of those 
larger domains. Your slip of the tongue probably does make some difference to value on the 
 
7 Singer, 2009, 97-98. 
8 Parfit, 2011, 620. 
9 Kahane, 2014. 
10 Wolf, 2007. Nozick (1989) also assumes that importance requires great impact. 
11 Hughes, 2017; Benatar, 2018. 
12 See Frankfurt, 1999, 93. 
13 My account here builds on the more informal remarks made in Kahane, 2014. 
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larger scale, making, say, your country or even the world a tiny bit worse (or better). But that 
difference is negligible compared to the difference made by so many other things.  
 So importance is relative: something can be important relative to one domain but trivial 
relative to another. But as what I just said also brings out, importance is also a relational 
property. We cannot tell how important something is just by tracing its own contribution to 
value. We also need to place it in relation to the difference made by other things. Ben Jonson 
was important in the Elizabethan scene, and in English culture more generally. But we cannot 
determine how important Jonson was just by knowing the quality of his work, or even what 
wider impact he had, if we don’t also know anything about, say, Shakespeare’s work and 
impact. Or to make the point counterfactually, Jonson would have been far more important 
had Shakespeare died very young—even if we hold Jonson’s wider influence fixed. In this 
way the notion of importance operates like that of gradable adjectives such as small, fast or 
expensive: whether something is important depends on what it’s surrounded by, just as 
whether something is small depends on the comparison class. I cannot say if a given object is 
small, even whether it’s small in the context of this room, just by knowing its absolute 
dimensions; I also need to know the size of the other things in the room. 
 On the Value Impact view, to be important you need to make a difference to value. We 
can think of that difference in terms of how much value a given thing brings about in the 
actual world. Or we can think of it in counterfactual terms, in terms of how much value 
would have been lost or gained had the thing not existed (or the event not occurred, etc.). 
And the relevant kind of value is intrinsic value: the value that something possesses in itself, 
not derivatively or instrumentally;14 and the difference in question is to the overall amount of 
intrinsic value in a domain—the balance in it of good and bad. However, while what matters 
to importance is the difference something makes to overall intrinsic value, since important 
things typically contribute to that value through their effects, importance typically supervenes 
on instrumental (i.e. non-intrinsic) value. The death of Franz Ferdinand was, let’s assume, 
bad in itself, but its historical importance is almost entirely due to the global upheaval it 
caused. We shall later see, however, that this needn’t always be so.  
 This account of importance leaves open several issues. In the simpler cases where the 
parts of the overall value of a domain can be neatly assigned to different contributors we can 
think of importance as a fixed amount that is divided between each of the contributors, in 
proportion to the difference they make to the total. But most cases aren’t that simple, and 
multiple factors are causally responsible, in different degrees, and in more or less direct 
fashion, for a given difference in value. But we can ignore this complication as it doesn’t 
affect the present argument. 
 The final element of the account is the normative upshot of being important. To be 
important is to merit being treated as important. And this, I say, is to deserve a degree of 
attention and concern that is proportional to one’s importance. A great deal of attention if one 
is extremely important; indifference, and dismissal, if one is insignificant.  
 Importance is thus not, as sometimes assumed, synonymous with value.15 It’s a function 
of value but a rather different property.16 Unlike importance, intrinsic value isn’t relative to a 
domain, or dependent on the value of other things in a domain. And we saw that importance, 
while a function of effect on intrinsic value, typically attaches to instrumental rather than 
 
14 As should be clear from this definition, I’ll be using ‘intrinsic value’ to refer to what Korsgaard (1983) calls 
‘final value’; the question of whether some things are valuable in themselves in virtue of their extrinsic 
properties is irrelevant to my argument here.  
15 Michael Smith (2006), for example, seems to identify importance with possessing value that is visible from an 
impersonal perspective. 
16 Kahane (2011), 749-750. 
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final value. A slip of the tongue may have far less intrinsic value than a headache; but, via its 
effects, can be far more important. 
 I now turn to address an objection in the other direction: that importance needn’t have 
anything to do with value. After all, we can speak about studying as important for doing well 
in the exam, or about a cogwheel being important for the functioning of some clock. But 
describing these things as important is perfectly compatible with seeing neither the exam nor 
the clock as having (or leading to) any intrinsic value. 
 We do use the notion of importance in a wider range of contexts than directly captured 
by the Value Impact account. But that’s not surprising since value terms such as good and 
bad also have such merely descriptive uses: things can have merely attributive goodness, 
such as being a good clock, or matter only as ways of achieving some given goal. But such 
value talk is either non-normative or has only conditional normativity. In much the same 
way, something might be important, say, for counting blades of grass, but this gives us no 
reason whatsoever to pay it attention unless we already have the goal of counting grass. To be 
sure, even what affects intrinsic value doesn’t immediately call for the attention of everyone. 
I can justifiably remain indifferent to, indeed ignorant of, events of immense importance in 
Moldovan history. But in virtue of their link to intrinsic value—these events might have led 
to decades of oppression, or transformed Moldovan poetry—they possess an inherent 
normativity that’s absent in merely descriptive importance. 
 Our lives are trivially important in numerous descriptive senses. But I believe that when 
people worry about the importance of their lives, they have in mind the normative sense I’ve 
been sketching, a sense that ties their lives to something that independently matters, that 
matters in a way that would be recognizable from a more impartial standpoint. And since our 
lives possess and influence intrinsic value, it’s also obvious that our lives are important, in 
the normative sense, on some small enough scale. What people worry about is rather that 





To speak about cosmic significance is, I suggest, just to speak of (normative) importance on 
the most expansive frame of reference: importance in relation to everything else out there, 
across all space and time. Our cosmic significance is thus the difference our existence makes 
in the grand scheme of things, when, literally, all things are considered. This is something we 
can’t know just by knowing the absolute value we possess or bring about, or by knowing 
what importance we possess relative to some arbitrarily narrower scale. 
 In the same way, what we can call our ultimate ‘largeness’—how our absolute size 
compares with everything out there—tells us how we ultimately measure up. On the 
terrestrial scale, we’re big compared to pencils and mice, small compared to elephants and 
skyscrapers. But it’s still a shock to realise that the gigantic Earth (gigantic compared to 
things typically salient to us) is itself miniscule, to put it mildly, compared to the vastness 
revealed by astrophysics. 
 It’s thus not surprising that people assume that the same follows for our importance on 
the cosmic scale. When we move up to a higher scale, the significance of things usually 
dramatically diminishes. We may expect the same to happen when we move, from the 
terrestrial scale to the preposterously vaster cosmic one. Moreover, if importance is what 
merits attention, it’s natural to use the following heuristic to determine a thing’s importance: 
would that thing receive attention from someone considering things on the relevant scale? 
And it’s also natural to think that we, being so tiny, would be invisible to someone adopting 
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such a cosmic viewpoint. I’ll later discuss another reason why people have this impression, 
one to do with our limited causal powers. 
 In past work I have argued, however, that this impression is mistaken. Not because it’s 
clear that we’re cosmically important, but because our dimensions are irrelevant to this 
question. What will decide it—as Singer and Parfit also seem to suggest—is whether we’re 
alone in the universe.  
 We can set out this argument as follows: 
 
 THE SOLITARY SIGNIFICANCE ARGUMENT 
 
(1)  The Value Impact view. The degree to which something is important, relative to a 
domain, is a function of how much difference it makes to overall intrinsic value in the 
domain, compared to other things in the domain.17 
 
(2)  How important something is on the cosmic scale is a function of how much of a 
difference it makes to the overall intrinsic value of the entire universe, compared to 
other things. [from 1] 
 
(3)  If something is the only thing of intrinsic value in the cosmos, then the overall value of 
the universe just is the value of that thing, and that thing therefore makes a maximal 
difference to the overall value of the universe. 
 
 Notice that (3) is true both in terms of the portion of overall value that would be 
attributable to that thing, and in counterfactual terms, on the assumption that if that thing 
hadn’t existed, the universe would contain nothing of value. 
 The argument further assumes that  
 
(4)  Terrestrial life has intrinsic value. 
 
 I mean this claim about terrestrial life as shorthand for all the value associated with 
sentient life on our planet, from the pains and pleasures of dormice to the horrors and 
triumphs of human history. Different axiologies will develop the details differently. For our 
purposes it’s enough that nearly everyone accepts some version of (4)—even pessimists, who 
think that this value is negative.  
 It follows from 2, 3 and 4 that 
 
(5)  If nothing outside the Earth has intrinsic value, then terrestrial life is important on the 
cosmic scale. 
 
 In fact, if we’re alone in the universe,18 then this has several further corollaries. First, 
terrestrial life would be the only cosmically important thing. Second, terrestrial life would be 
 
17 Notice that for the purposes of this argument, it is enough if the Value Impact view states a sufficient 
condition for importance. Thus, while I will go on to argue against several alternative accounts of importance, 
the Solitary Significance argument is compatible with a disjunctive view on which one or more of these 
accounts captures independent conditions that are also sufficient for importance. 
18 My argument assumes here that if we’re alone in the universe, then there is nothing of intrinsic value outside 
the Earth. This would just follow on the widely held assumption that sentience (or perhaps life more generally) 
is a necessary condition for intrinsic value. But the argument is compatible with thinking that, say, great works 
of art possess intrinsic value independently of being experienced by anyone; if we’re the only intelligent beings 
in the universe, art is a purely terrestrial affair. Things would get more complicated if we also ascribed intrinsic 
value to, say, majestic canyons. But I have argued elsewhere that, coupled with plausible assumptions about the 
comparative value of natural aesthetic value and that of sentient and intelligent beings, even such an axiology 
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the most cosmically important thing. And third, terrestrial life would be maximally 
cosmically important—as cosmically important as anything can be. 
 The argument speaks of the value, and thus of the cosmic significance, of terrestrial life 
as a whole.19 But with the added (and widely held assumption) that we humans, and the kinds 
of things we can do or bring about, are of far greater value than other terrestrial sentient 
beings, it also follows that we humans collectively possess the greatest cosmic significance.  
 Now the conclusion of the argument is a conditional. We don’t know if its antecedent is 
true. But so long as it might be true then we might be of great cosmic significance. I think it’s 
also almost certainly true that if we’re not alone, and many other intelligent lifeforms exist, 
then we really lack any cosmic importance.20 
 When Wolf writes that “[w]e want to be important, but we cannot be important” on the 
cosmic scale,21 this can refer either to us as individuals or to us as a collective. When people 
worry about cosmic significance, they often have both in mind, and Benatar makes it clear 
that, on his view, neither matters “sub specie aeternitatis”.22 The Solitary Significance 
Argument says that if we humans are alone in the universe, we are collectively of great 
cosmic significance. But, as I point out elsewhere, we already know that we’re not alone qua 
individuals—there are, after all, all these billions of other people around. So the Value Impact 
Account also entails that, as individuals, we are unimportant, not only on the cosmic scale but 
even on much smaller ones.23 This shouldn’t be surprising. Unless delusional, few of us think 
of ourselves as possessing world-historical significance. And if we’re not remotely 
 
would be compatible with the Solitary Significance Argument (though perhaps not with its title…). For further 
discussion see Kahane (2014), 756-769. 
19 Benatar speculates that my argument is concerned with our moral status (Ibid., 49-50), and he agrees that 
there’s a sense in which “our value could be significant in some distant corner of the universe”, such that other 
intelligent beings shouldn’t treat us in certain ways. But this, Benatar rightly says, is irrelevant to angst about 
cosmic insignificance. However, that’s an odd interpretation of an argument which revolves around the idea that 
we’d be cosmically significant only if other intelligent beings don’t exist. The Value Impact Account merely 
makes familiar assumptions about intrinsic value and the relation between the value of wholes/worlds and of 
their parts. There is a sense in which the overall value of a world is its value as seen from an impartial 
perspective. But even an amoralist can care about importance in this sense. 
20 Benatar argues that this line of argument has odd implications. The first is that “[e]ven if one thinks that 
humans may have more cosmic [significance] than toads can have, it is still the case, according to the argument, 
that if humans have immense cosmic meaning, toads also have impressive cosmic [significance].” (Ibid., 50 I’ve 
replaced ‘meaning’ with ‘significance’). Benatar is right that the argument has this implication, but it’s not clear 
why that’s a problem. If there’s no life anywhere else in the universe, then all terrestrial life is utterly unique, on 
the cosmic scale, and thus incredibly precious. When we think of toads against that background they do seem 
amazing. Imagine holding a toad in your hand, thinking: “There’s nothing remotely like that in the entire 
universe. Only right here, on seemingly unremarkable Earth, did such astonishingly complex beings evolve—
beings that are sentient, and thus valuable. If all life on Earth goes extinct, there will be nothing of value 
anywhere.” Far from being absurd, this seems exactly right. Because we inhabit such an organically rich 
environment, we lose touch of that extraordinary fact. Another supposed odd implication relates to the way that 
on the Value Impact Account the importance of something depends on what else of value surrounds it. Benatar 
thinks that because, unlike the universe around us, the Earth is teeming with life, it follows that “human life 
would have much less terrestrial significance than cosmic significance. (Human life would have less terrestrial 
significance because there are also aardvarks, elephants, llamas, and zebras, for example.) This is the exact 
opposite of what we usually think.” (Ibid. 51). The argument doesn’t have this implication. On Earth, our 
significance is qualified by the existence of many other sentient beings, even if we humans are more valuable, 
and therefore more significant. That’s an implication of the account and is, I believe, correct. But when we turn 
to the cosmic scale, we need to consider all things of value and this would still include all those llamas and 
zebras. So we possess the same comparative importance, on that scale, not more. There is one difference: here 
we (and the toads too) can be said to be more important than many more things: all those planetary systems, 
black holes, etc. 
21 Wolf, 2011. 
22 Ibid., 26. 
23 Kahane, 2014, 762ff. 
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candidates for importance on the terrestrial or even national scale, why expect to suddenly be 
important on the cosmic one? However, my argument doesn’t rule out individual cosmic 
importance. I mentioned Hitler as an example of someone important, but so were the Buddha, 
Elizabeth I, and Mandela. These are all figures of great terrestrial importance—at least so far. 
If we’re alone in the universe then it follows that they also possess corresponding cosmic 
importance (conversely, these examples also suggest how we humans could still aspire to be 
collectively cosmically significant even if we’re not alone.) Now, it’s unlikely that anyone 
reading this has a real shot at world historical importance and thus, at least potentially, at 
individual cosmic importance. But it can still matter to us that we together might matter on 
the grandest scale. We can still make our much smaller contributions to the collective effort, 
and these contributions would have a different character if we’re alone in the universe—our 
footnote to a footnote to Plato means more, for example, if humanity’s fumbling 
philosophical reflections aren’t merely treading well-worn paths crossed long ago by 
thousands of other civilizations. 
 We often think about importance in terms of degree: things can be more or less 
important, and therefore also more or less important compared to other things. But we 
sometimes speak of importance in a categorical sense: when something is important enough, 
we can describe it simply as important, period. Thus, to describe something as insignificant is 
ambiguous. It can mean either that something has zero importance, or that it possesses far too 
little importance to count as categorically important. Very few people would be appropriately 
described as (categorically) important on, say, the national scale, let alone the world-
historical one. But as I noted above, this doesn’t mean we possess zero importance. We do 
make a difference, it’s just a comparatively tiny one.  
 When people worry about our cosmic significance, they sometimes worry that nothing 
humanity does is important, period, on the cosmic scale. As I’ve argued, if we’re alone in the 
universe then we would collectively be very important and, therefore, straightforwardly also 
categorically important—and at least a few people might even be individually cosmically 
important; but it’s very hard to see how humanity as we know it would count as important in 
this way if the universe is teeming with intelligent life. However, I suspect that many people 
also think that each of us, and humanity as a whole, possess zero importance when viewed on 
the cosmic scale. This is simply false on the Value Impact view, even in a densely populated 
universe. We would still make our little contribution, our small (comparative) difference to 
overall value. We won’t be significant—particularly worthy of note—but neither would we 
be literally absolutely insignificant.24 
 
Cosmic Significance and Causal Impact 
 
Hughes and Benatar reject the Solitary Significance argument because they think it fails to 
address the true source of angst about cosmic insignificance. What people worry about is 
that, because we are so small, we have no causal impact beyond the Earth. Hughes thinks we 
are depressed by how small we are compared to the universe because “[r]ecognition of the 
tiny place we occupy in the Universe throws a stark light on our distinct lack of causal 
power.”25 And Benatar writes that when people “notice how cosmically insignificant we are” 
what they notice is that  
 
“[a]lthough we collectively can have some effect on our planet, we have no significant impact on 
the broader universe. Nothing we do on earth has any effect beyond it…”26 
 
24 I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this. 
25 Hughes, 2017.  
26 Ibid., 36 
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 According to the Solitary Significance Argument, we’d be cosmically significant if 
we’re alone in the universe. But since this won’t change our causal impotence on the cosmic 
scale, Hughes and Benatar argue that this couldn’t give us the kind of significance we crave.  
 We can begin by asking whether to have cosmic significance just is to have causal 
influence at the cosmic level. Call this the Causal Impact View. Hughes holds this view. On 
his diagnosis it is causal power alone that we crave at the cosmic scale. Hughes points out 
that there are contexts where we do describe things as significant in virtue of their causal 
impact—e.g., a body of moist warm air might be significant in the sequence of events that led 
to the formation of a hurricane. And he goes on to argue that, by contrast with the kind of 
importance I describe, increased causal powers at the cosmic level would remove our angst 
about our miniscule size:   
 
“Suppose… that we were to have control over the trajectory of distant stars, and the future of far-
flung galaxies; that we could bend and warp the course of the Universe to fit our purposes, and 
so on. Would we still feel cosmically insignificant? I doubt it. Probably we would feel rather 
pleased with ourselves.”27 
 
 But this isn’t a good test of the Causal Impact View given that our ability to change the 
universe to fit our purposes would (or could) closely link these imagined causal powers to 
valuable, indeed massively valuable, outcomes. Our purposes are unlikely to involve shifting 
random dust clouds in some galaxy as opposed to, say, colonising distant planets or creating 
majestic art on an astronomical scale.  
 We need scenarios where we have causal influence at the cosmic level but without 
making any difference to value. Imagine we invented a device that allowed us to change the 
orbits of numerous planets in faraway galaxies. Our causal reach would be vast. By 
assumption, controlling these planetary trajectories in this way would make no difference to 
value—it wouldn’t make anything better or worse if we shift these planets in this or that 
direction; assume, for instance, that there’s no life, and never could be life, on the affected 
planets. 
 Would this orbit turner address worries about our cosmic significance? This seems to me 
doubtful. To be sure, at first we might feel a sense of power. Puffing our chests, we might 
think: ‘Yes, we might be specks, but specks that can shape what happens in the furthest 
galaxies’. But a moment’s reflection will dispel the illusion. Whatever we do here on Earth—
all the things that matter to us—people’s lives, and the suffering they contain, our greatest 
achievements, etc.—would still have no cosmic significance whatsoever. And the one way in 
which we would supposedly have cosmic significance would, by definition, be frivolous. 
After all, controlling planets like that has precisely the character of an insignificant choice: 
there’s no reason whatsoever to move them in this rather than that direction. Perhaps there’s 
still reason to move them in some direction? Well, would you really line up eagerly to get 
your turn at the orbit turner, expecting to finally be endowed with the craved for cosmic 
significance? It might be amusing to fiddle with this extraordinary gadget. But it’s the wrong 
kind of thing to endow humanity with missing gravitas. If Sisyphean rolling of one terrestrial 
rock up a hill is pointless, surely rolling billions such rocks across the universe is just as 
pointless. 
 We need to distinguish two questions. One is whether, when people worry about cosmic 
significance, what they crave is causal power. The other is whether mere causal power is 
worth having. Hughes actually agrees that mere causal power isn’t worth having, or worrying 
about it. As Hughes concedes, power only matters instrumentally—i.e. via its effect on value. 
 
27 Hughes, 2017. 
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And he comes close to agreeing that it’s really importance in the evaluative sense that 
matters.28 However, I think my discussion above suggests that mere causal power isn’t even 
what people want. Why should they crave such an unimportant kind of importance?  
 Hughes replies that  
 
“We tend to treat power as though it is intrinsically valuable. We seek it out and covet it, quite 
irrespective of how we might wield it and what it might get us. One need only look at the history 
of totalitarian politics to recognise this tendency in its most grotesque form.”29 
 
 But most people aren’t power hungry in this way, including many of those who worry 
about their cosmic insignificance. And such existential angst is a feeling that’s easy enough 
to elicit in nearly anyone—it doesn’t especially afflict those who lust for power; arguably the 
opposite is the case. More importantly, even the power hungry don’t desire to move rocks 
around or change the spin of sub-particles; they want to control other people or to have 
elevated social status. Thus, while we may attribute causal importance to things in various 
descriptive contexts, the kind of importance people actually seek involves at least a potential 
link to value.  
 
Is Causal Influence Even Necessary for Importance? 
 
When people want to be important, or least not totally unimportant, they don’t want merely to 
make a causal difference. But the discussion so far suggests an alternative view: that people 
associate cosmic importance with having a causal impact on the cosmic level in a way that 
does make a difference to value. Such a view would basically combine the Causal Impact 
View and the Value Impact View. I’ll therefore call it the Combined View.  
 Nozick seems to have held this view. He thought that something of value cannot be 
important if it doesn’t have impact, but also that “[a]n important event… is one with effects 
that matter, ones that make a large difference to (the amount or character) of value or 
meaning, or to some other evaluative dimension”.30 
 Benatar also seems to accept this view. He links significance to making a causal 
difference, and tells us that one way for a life to be significant is for it to make a mark. And 
when Benatar gives examples of lives that are terrestrially important these are usually of lives 
that made a great causal impact, including figures such as Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot.31 Yet 
these people didn’t merely make a great neutral causal effect, but a horrifically negative one. 
Benatar also considers the view that we should focus only on lives that make a ‘positive, 
worthy or valuable’ impact, and he later writes about transcending one’s limits ‘in a valuable 
way’.32 And unlike Hughes, Benatar clearly thinks that importance in this sense is well worth 
having—and that we’re therefore right to feel depressed about our cosmic insignificance. 
 Since on the Combined View it’s still the case that we cannot have cosmic significance 
without having causal impact on the cosmic scale, this view is still inconsistent with the 
Solitary Significance Argument argument. 
 While I will argue against the Combined View, I concede that it has initial plausibility. 
Paradigmatic examples of people, acts and events that we consider important on the 
terrestrial and smaller scales involve making a considerable difference to value by making a 
large and extensive causal difference. Think again of Hitler, the Buddha, or Mandela. 
 
28 Hughes, 2017. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Nozick, 1989, 170-172. 
31 Benatar, 2018, 19. 
32 Benatar, 2018, 19. 
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Moreover, when people aspire to be important, or do something important, these are often 
their models. You don’t become important, it seems, by cultivating your garden. You must go 
out and change the world. 
 However, there’s something puzzling about the idea that extensive causal impact matters 
in this way. We said that causal power can have great instrumental significance: by having 
greater causal impact, we can typically bring about, and influence, more value. And often, we 
have a greater effect on value by having a causal impact that extends further in space and 
time. But that’s compatible with the Value Impact view. Causal influence is a means to 
making more of a difference in value. And the spatial extent of one’s causal influence matters 
only to the extent that the relevant space contains more things of value one can influence. But 
this often isn’t the case. The mayor of NYC is more important than the governor of Alaska.  
 The question is why, when one does make a certain difference to value, it should matter 
whether this effect on value is achieved via spatiotemporally extensive causal impact rather 
than a localised effect. Just as it’s hard to see why size or distance matter in themselves, it’s 
hard to see why it should matter whether the difference in value that something brings about 
is concentrated in a spectacular speck or achieved via an explosion spanning the entirety of 
universe. 
Benatar’s Argument 
So it’s puzzling why we would need spatially extensive causal influence to be cosmically 
important. Some remarks of Benatar, however, suggest an argument that would explain why 
this might matter. Benatar writes, 
“Many people who are concerned that life is meaningless… notice how cosmically insignificant 
we are. Although we collectively can have some effect on our planet, we have no significant 
impact on the broader universe. Nothing we do on earth has any effect beyond it… That is true of 
us as individuals, but in the grand sweep of planetary time, let alone cosmic time, it is also true of 
our species and all life.  
     Earthly life is thus without significance, import, or purpose beyond our planet… Neither our 
species nor individual members of it matter sub specie aeternitatis.”33 
 
 While Benatar acknowledges that meaning, import and purpose aren’t synonymous, he 
thinks that’s irrelevant to the question of cosmic significance.34 I disagree. When people 
wonder whether their lives are meaningful, they occasionally mean to ask whether their lives 
are important. But on many influential accounts of meaning, meaning and importance can 
easily come apart: many lives that are intuitively meaningful aren’t important in any 
interesting sense, and many important lives possess little or no meaning.35 My argument is 
that we might be cosmically significant in the sense of being important at the cosmic level, 
and he explicitly denies that this entails that our lives possess cosmic meaning, or would cure 
us of all forms of existential angst.36 And it seems to me that even if we were cosmically 
important on the Combined View—imagine being the leader of a sprawling intergalactic 
civilization—we could still wonder whether our lives are meaningful.  
 We can, however, set this aside, since Benatar explicitly asserts that the considerations 
quoted above show that our lives are “without… import… beyond our planet”. In what 
follows, I will focus only on the question of importance.  
 
33 Ibid., 26. 
34 Ibid. 17-18. 
35 I argue for this in Kahane (forthcoming); see also Frankfurt (1999). Metz’s (2013) criticism of 
consequentialist accounts of meaning also shows that importance isn’t necessary for meaningfulness. 
36 Kahane, 2014, 765, fn. 17. 
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 We can set out Benatar’s argument as follows: 
 








 C2. Earthly life is without significance or import beyond our planet. 
 
 To be significant, then, is to have significant impact, where significant impact is 
understood in causal terms. We are cosmically insignificant because we don’t have such 
causal impact on the ‘broader universe’.  
 The claim couldn’t be that we don’t have any causal impact on the universe. We do, 
since we have causal impact here on Earth, and the Earth is part of the universe. Nor is it 
plausible that for something to be important in relation to a spatiotemporal region, it needs to 
have causal impact on each and every part of that region. Napoleon wasn’t an insignificant 
figure in European history just because his campaigns didn’t impact some Finnish village. It 
wouldn’t help much, of course, to say that we need to have significant causal impact on the 
universe, since we’re now precisely trying to figure out what is required for something to be 
significant. And although it might be tempting to unpack ‘significant impact’ as having a 
causal effect on most of something, this isn’t plausible either since, even on Benatar’s view, 
we’d presumably have the requisite causal impact if we could control the trajectory of all 
planets in the universe; yet such an impact would still affect only a fraction of the cosmos. 
 Benatar could rightly reply that he doesn’t need to provide a positive account of what 
kind of causal impact we’ll need to have to count as cosmically significant. Whatever that is, 
it’s clear we don’t have it since we cannot causally affect anything beyond the Earth.  
 Now, two qualifications need to be made to that last claim. First, via space probes like 
the Voyager, or the radio signals we emit, we do have causal effects that extend beyond the 
solar system. But these are presumably too meagre. Second, and more importantly, we cannot 
rule out that in the distant future we humans will be able to explore the Milky Way, and 
perhaps beyond. So Benatar must either assume that even such a future couldn’t endow us 
with any cosmic significance, or his claim must be the weaker one that at present we have no 
cosmic significance but that it’s nevertheless possible (if unlikely) that we’ll attain such 
significance in the future. That would be a major concession since our current actions can 
affect whether we could have such future impact, potentially endowing these acts with a 
degree of cosmic significance even on Benatar’s terms.  
 But set this aside. According to the Solitary Significance argument, we could have great 
cosmic importance even if we never leave the confines of our planet. For this to be right, 
Benatar’s inference must be mistaken. I’ll argue that this inference trades on two ambiguities. 
The first relates to the claim about having no impact on the ‘broader universe’. We’re asking 
whether we have cosmic significance—significance from a perspective that considers the 
entire cosmos. ‘Broader universe’ can refer to such a contrast between cosmic significance 
and merely terrestrial significance. But Benatar seems to take ‘broader universe’ to refer to 
other parts of the universe. And it begs the question to assume that we cannot have an impact 
on the universe as a whole without having a causal effect on the rest of its parts. Now it 
seems right that if you’re cosmically important, then you’re important not just on Earth but 
also on, say, Alpha Centauri. But that’s just to say that if there are (or were) intelligent beings 
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on Alpha Centauri, you’d deserve their attention if you were cosmically important. This in no 
way shows that you need to causally influence Alpha Centauri to deserve such attention. 
 We should turn to ask, then, what is required for something to make a difference to the 
universe as a whole. As a first pass, it seems plausible that for something to make a 
difference to something else, the former needs to make a difference to the properties of the 
latter. But it’s actually very easy to affect some properties of the universe: because we exist, 
the universe has the property of containing homo sapience, and even the property of 
containing my sneeze. For obvious reasons, it won’t help to say that to be important, one has 
to make a difference to the universe’s important properties. Can we identify the universe’s 
important properties with its fundamental properties? But if ‘fundamental’ just means 
important, this doesn’t help while it’s implausible that be important one has to be 
ontologically fundamental (it’s Napoleon who is historically important, not his sub-atomic 
components).  
 You might think that the relevant properties must be those that would be mentioned in a 
cosmological account of the universe and its history—just as a mark of something’s 
terrestrial importance is that it deserves mention in a history of the world.37 This might seem 
to support Benatar’s argument. A complete cosmology should mention the laws of nature, the 
Big Bang, galaxy formation and black holes, but why should it mention the denizens of a 
random planet orbiting a humdrum star? Well, as it happens, cosmologists are much troubled 
by the fact that the cosmos is such as to make possible, and contain, beings such as us who 
can adopt such a cosmological perspective. So by this criterion, we are cosmically important.  
 It could be objected that an interest in this issue is just a projection of the concerns of 
terrestrial cosmologists onto a perspective from which such questions aren’t of any internal 
interest. But I don’t see the basis for this assertion. Nor is the issue specifically terrestrial in 
focus: if there are further intelligent lifeforms in the universe, the question arises with respect 
to them with equal force. It could be replied that this would just broaden the concern to one 
shared by rational beings, without thereby becoming an issue of interest at the cosmic scale. 
But it’s hard to see how one could draw a distinction between cosmic importance and what 
impartial rational beings considering the cosmos as a whole should find worthy of attention 
(it’s not as if there’s also the alternative perspective of non-rational things). 
 In any event, I don’t particularly see the basis for identifying importance on the cosmic 
scale with what cosmologists pay, or ought to pay, attention to. Cosmology does, of course, 
consider things on the cosmic scale but that hardly endows it with automatic authority about 
what counts as significant on this scale. 
 I believe, however, that we don’t need a non-circular account of what counts as a 
significant cosmic property to identify one set of properties that merit this epithet—the 
axiological properties of the universe.38 These include:  
 
whether the universe contains anything of value;  
what, in consequence, is the overall value of the universe;  
whether that value is overall positive or negative, and to what degree. 
 
 It’s hard to see what could be a more important property of the universe than its value, or 
lack thereof. If there was (or is) a god, then these are the key (perhaps only) properties such a 
being would consider when deciding whether to create a given world. If the universe is 
overall bad, then it would have been better if it never came to exist, or if it ceased to exist. 
 
37 See Kahane (2014); Benatar (2018), 32.  
38 This idea seems to me implicit in the passages from Singer (2009) and Parfit (2011) that I quoted at the start. 
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And if the universe has no value, it really doesn’t matter whether it exists.39 What could be 
more important than that?40 
Importance without Causal Impact 
I said that Benatar’s argument trades on two ambiguities. The first was the slide from impact 
on the universe as a whole to impact on other parts of the universe. The second is the slide 
from the idea of making a difference or impact at some scale to the assumption that this 
difference needs to involve a causal effect on that scale, or even to be causal at all.  
 According to the Solitary Significance Argument, we terrestrials might make a massive 
non-causal difference to the universe as a whole by instantiating all the value that the 
universe contains—though, to be precise, much of that cosmic difference is achieved by us 
making a causal difference to what happens here on little Earth.  
 It’s easy to overlook this possibility because paradigmatic cases of great importance do 
involve great, and spatiotemporally extended, causal influence. Napoleon’s decisions directly 
affected the lives of vast number of Europeans, and their longer-term causal influence 
extends even further in space and time.  
 The very idea of someone having world historical significance without having any causal 
influence beyond, say, their tiny village seems preposterous. This, however, is because 
historically important figures like Napoleon gain their significance by their effect on the lives 
of many other people—numerous sentient beings that themselves have value and are 
spatiotemporally spread; and that effect is in large part also due to how people perceive, and 
respond to, the acts of the historical figure.  
 We cannot affect the broader universe in this way. This isn’t just because we don’t have 
the causal power but also because, at least as of now, we aren’t even aware of any others we 
could so influence. If there are intelligent forms of life out there, then such influence is at 
least conceivable, and such far-reaching influence might even be in our future, even if that’s 
unlikely. In fact, if the universe is teeming with intelligent life—if we’re not alone—then 
such extensive causal influence may be the only way we could be cosmically important. But 
if we’re alone, that’s just irrelevant. We wouldn’t need such far-reaching influence to make a 
great difference to the overall value of the universe. 
 The overall value of something is a function of the intrinsic values of its parts. The 
overall value of a spatiotemporal region is, at least in large part, the sum (on some views, 
average) of the value that region contains.41 Those parts of that region that don’t contain 
anything of value, whether positive or negative—let alone those parts of it that are literally 
empty—make no difference to the value of the whole. What matters, with respect to what 
difference something makes to the value of the whole, isn’t how large or small it is, where it 
is located, or its spatiotemporal distribution, but how much intrinsic value it has, or brings 
about. Note how natural it is to describe the role a given thing has in determining the value of 
the whole in terms of what difference it makes—yet that difference-making doesn’t involve 
causation but what we might call contribution (though, again, that global contribution will 
often supervene on local causal effects).  
 
39 Kant thought that if there were no rational beings in the universe, it would be “a mere wasteland, gratuitous 
and without a final purpose” (Kant, 1987, 331). 
40 Some think that value properties aren’t visible from a genuine cosmic standpoint. But that cosmologists don’t 
ascribe such properties is irrelevant, as I said. Moreover, if value is actually an illusion, it would also be an 
illusion on smaller scales—undermining all forms of (normative) importance. And if it’s not an illusion, then 
nothing stops us from speaking about the value of the entire universe (see also Kahane, 2014, 747-748). 
41 The relation between the value of wholes and that of their parts isn’t always simply aggregative. For example, 
there may be Moorean organic unities, and some hold that the value of a whole can also be affected by how the 
value contained in it is distributed. But so far as I can see, this doesn’t bear on my argument here. 
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 In this way, a momentary speck surrounded by vast emptiness can make a massive 
difference to the overall value of the entire universe even if it has no causal effects 
whatsoever. Pari passu, it can make such a difference without having causal reach throughout 
the surrounding emptiness.  
 It might help to move away from the grand cosmic scale to examples of such non-causal 
impact in more familiar territory. Consider first how a temporal part of a whole can affect its 
overall value without making any causal difference to the rest. Take a person’s life. If an 
otherwise modestly pleasant life ends with a relatively short period of extraordinary 
suffering, that grim end can massively affect the overall quality of that person’s life—how 
good or bad it was for her—even though it has no causal effects at all on any prior part of that 
life. That period of agony is obviously incredibly important in the context of that person’s 
life—it’s something you must mention when recounting that life. In the same vein, it’s of 
immense world historic significance whether the last decade before humanity’s extinction 
would be peaceful or involve great agony.42 
 It’s not as easy to point to examples of actual things that have, or had, world historical 
significance, whether over time or at a time, without also having considerable, and usually 
spatially extensive, causal influence. But this isn’t surprising. First, the value of the whole is 
a function of the value of its parts, and something important must make a great difference to 
the value of the whole compared to other things that make a difference to value. In a world 
with billions of people (not to mention other sentient beings) scattered both spatially and 
temporally, it’s extremely hard for someone to make such a difference without affecting any 
of these billions of others. Second, when something is important, this importance is often 
noticed, and being perceived as important has further effects that augment its importance. For 
someone to be important without causal impact their initial importance must remain 
unknown, or unrecognised; so it’s not surprising that it’s hard to point to examples of such 
importance. And this can skew our thinking about importance.  
 It’s easier, however, to come up with relevant examples in the aesthetic or intellectual 
domain since here individuals can create, or discover, things of comparatively immense value 
compared to what numerous other people create or discover. There are hypothetical cases: 
think of Kafka’s work, which he had asked Max Brod to destroy after his death. Brod ignored 
that request, and Kafka became one of the most influential authors of the 20th century. Had 
Brod kept his promise, Kafka wouldn’t have this influence, and would therefore not be as 
important. But he would still have written landmarks of European literature—landmarks that, 
sadly, no one would have read. And he would therefore still be an extraordinarily important 
literary figure, even if no one would know that.43 There may also be actual cases: think, for 
example, about Bruno Shultz’s manuscript, Messiah, that was lost in the Holocaust. It may 
have been Shultz’s masterpiece and, therefore, an important, perhaps ground-breaking text 
that no one will ever read. Other candidates are Walter Benjamin’s lost black briefcase, 
containing an unknown manuscript, and Rimbaud’s destroyed ‘La Chassee sprituelle’, which 
Verlaine saw as his masterpiece. These are examples of works that, if in fact great, merit 
being described as important even if they had no real causal impact.44   
 
42 But can’t we say that the agony at the end of a person’s life caused his life as a whole to be worse? But if we 
can say that, we can also say that what we do here on Earth causes the universe as a whole to be better or worse. 
If that’s all that’s needed to make a causal impact on the cosmic scale then the Combined View would pose no 
threat to the Solitary Significance Argument. But presumably that’s not what Benatar means by causal impact. 
43 Benatar himself mentions this example (Ibid., 25-26)—arguing that Kafka’s life was objectively meaningful 
even if he experienced it as meaningless; and Benatar seems to think that had Brod destroyed the manuscripts, 
Kafka’s life really would’ve been meaningless. This seems to me doubtful but my claim is concerned only with 
importance. Note that Benatar agrees that things can be important without being known to be such. 
44 Nozick (1989, 171) gives the game of chess as an example of something that has value yet isn’t important 
because it lacks enough impact. But the Value Impact view can explain this example. Value isn’t sufficient for 
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Not Enough Value? 
 
Benatar writes that 
 
“it is possible to possess the most value without possessing much value. Even if we were the 
most valuable beings in the universe, it would not follow that we are immensely valuable. The 
value we do have would not be increased by the fact that there was nothing else of value. By 
analogy, the bowhead whale is the animal species with the longest lifespan of all earthlings, 
perhaps living up to or beyond two centuries. If it also has the longest lifespan in the universe, it 
would not follow that the lifespan is immense (when judged by the standards of cosmic time).”45  
 
 Benatar is correct that to know that something has the most value (a comparative claim) 
tells us nothing about how much value it possesses (an absolute matter). Nor is something’s 
value affected by what else of value exists. However, the Value Impact view makes neither of 
these assumptions. On this view, importance is a function of the difference one makes to the 
value of a domain compared to other things in the domain. So the existence of other things of 
value is meant to bear on our significance, not our value. If something decides the overall 
value of a domain then it’s extremely important relative to that domain even if, in absolute 
terms, it possesses modest value.  
 It may seem odd that something with so little value could be so important, and Benatar’s 
remarks suggest that he assumes that for something to be important it must possess (or affect) 
‘much’ value. Call this the Threshold View. 
 The Threshold View cannot explain why the vastness of the universe makes us feel 
insignificant, since if we’re not good enough, we won’t be good enough even if the universe 
was much smaller and we were the largest thing in it. And if it’s taken to state a sufficient 
condition for importance, it’s incompatible with the Combined View. Imagine a tiny spot of 
infinite value. That tiny spot, with zero further causal influence, and a minimal 
spatiotemporal extension, would easily cross the threshold. But on the Combined View, it 
couldn’t possess any kind of importance, indeed, would be even less important than we are. 
Perhaps it’s considerations such as these that lead Benatar to reject the Threshold View as 
stating a sufficient condition for cosmic importance.46 But he appears to regard it as a 
necessary condition. What I’ll say below applies to either reading of this view. 
 On one way of developing this view, there’s a certain amount of value one must possess 
to count as important. It’s not clear how such an absolute threshold is to be drawn, and I 
don’t see why we should assume that we don’t meet it. Looking around, we find billions of 
humans and trillions of other sentient beings. This doesn’t seem negligible. Moreover, if we 
fail to meet the threshold, we’d also fail to meet it on smaller scales on which Benatar 
assumes we are significant. 
 In any event, when we describe things as having immense or negligible value we don’t 
apply such an absolute threshold. We draw a line that’s relative to a comparison class, just as 
we do when we use other gradables such as ‘large’ or ‘slow’. Compared to the value of that 
lonesome slug, actual terrestrial value is immense; in the context of a universe teeming with 
intelligent life and grand intergalactic civilizations, terrestrial value will seem almost 
negligible. But that’s just my argument about importance, now stated directly in terms of 
 
impact, and the difference to value made by chess, compared to other things that affect value, isn’t large enough 
to make it genuinely important. 
45 Ibid., 49. 
46 Ibid., 49. 
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these contextual value predicates. If the threshold adjusts in this way, such a threshold is 
perfectly compatible with the Solitary Significance argument.  
 Benatar’s analogy with size suggests that the relevant threshold at the cosmic scale must 
somehow reflect a standard set by the universe. But this analogy backfires. Compared to the 
size of the universe, it’s indeed an understatement to say that the size of a bowhead whale is 
negligible. But—assuming that we’re alone in the universe—if we compare terrestrial value 
to that of the entire universe, we find that they are identical. So we turn out to have very 
considerable value by this cosmic standard.  
 I therefore conclude that we should either reject the Threshold View as a necessary or 
sufficient condition for importance, or think of the threshold in a way that broadly tracks the 
Value Impact account. Thus, if we’re alone in the universe, we’d be the most important thing 
in it regardless of how much value we realise absolutely. That humanity could have realised 
far more value is obvious. We aren’t nearly close to being the best we could be, let alone the 
best there could be. How far we fall short is a matter of debate. But this doesn’t matter. Even 
if Lovecraft is right and we really are ‘miserable’, we might still be the most important thing 




Physicist Laurence Krauss once said that 
 
“The picture that science presents to us is… uncomfortable because what we’ve learned is that 
we are more insignificant than we ever could have imagined. You could get rid of us and all the 
galaxies and everything we see in the universe and it will be largely the same.”47  
 
 And Benatar similarly writes that 
 
“As impressed as (some) humans often are about the significance of humanity’s presence in the 
cosmos, our absence would have made absolutely no difference to the rest of the universe. We 
serve no purpose in the cosmos and, although our efforts have some significance here and now, it 
is seriously limited both spatially and temporally.”48 
 
 And he tries to console us with the thought that it at least matters at the terrestrial level, 
for example, 
 
“whether or not one is adding to the vast amounts of harm on earth, even though that makes no 
difference to the rest of the cosmos.”49  
 
 It’s true that if we disappeared, this wouldn’t make any causal difference to anything 
beyond the Earth—to the ‘rest of the cosmos’. But we can now see that Benatar is mistaken 
in concluding from this that we cannot make a difference to the “rest of the cosmos”, or that 
the harm we cause matters only here on Earth. If we’re alone, we make a vast (non-causal) 
difference to the universe as a whole and, consequently, also to the rest of the universe. After 
all, if we are alone in the universe, not just right now but across time, then the total value of 
the entire universe is the same as the total value contained here on little Earth. And if we 
miserably fail, then by our own acts, which influence just minor aspects of the Earth’s 
 
47 Krauss, 2012. 
48 Ibid., 63. 
49 Ibid., 63. 
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surface, we have single-handedly changed the valence of the entire universe to negative.50 
Yes, if you get rid of us, the surrounding galaxies will remain the same. But the universe will 
be utterly different. To remain indifferent to that possibility, to feel that what we collectively 
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